ABSTRACT. This paper studies the MOR cryptosystem, using the automorphism group of the extra-special p-group of exponent p, for an odd prime p. Similar results can be obtained for extra-special p-groups of exponent p 2 and for the even prime.
INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we study the MOR cryptosystem with extra-special p groups. Similar studies were done, using the group of unitriangular matrices [3] and the group of unimodular matrices [4] . The group of unitriangular matrices and the group of unimodular matrices are both matrix groups. There are many ways to represent a group -natural representations, like a matrix representation or permutation representation, or a more abstract representation in the form of generators and relations, commonly known as a finite presentation. In this paper, we shift our study of the MOR cryptosystem, from the matrix representation of a group to a finite presentation. We show that using finite presentation, in the form of generators and relations, one can build a secure MOR cryptosystem.
In a MOR cryptosystem, one works with the discrete logarithm problem in the automorphism group. On one hand, this is not a major change, because the discrete logarithm problem works in a group and the automorphisms form a group. On the other hand, an automorphism group arises from any algebraic structure, like a graph, vector space, etc. So the MOR cryptosystem can be seen, as the one, that liberates the discrete logarithm problem from groups to other algebraic structures.
THE MOR CRYPTOSYSTEM
In this section we describe the MOR cryptosystem [1, 6] as automorphisms of a finite group G, however it can be generalized to other finitely generated algebraic structures easily. A description and a critical analysis of the MOR cryptosystem is in [3] and the references there.
2.1. Description of the MOR cryptosystem. Let G = g 1 , g 2 , . . . , g τ , τ ∈ N be a finite group and φ a non-trivial automorphism of G. Alice's keys are as follows:
a: To send a message (plaintext) a ∈ G Bob computes φ r and φ mr for a random r ∈ N.
Decryption.
a: Alice knows m, so if she receives the ciphertext (φ r , φ mr (a)), she computes φ mr from φ r and then φ −mr and then computes a from φ mr (a).
Alice knows the order of the automorphism φ, she can use the identity φ t−1 = φ −1 whenever φ t = 1 to compute φ −mr .
NOTATIONS AND DEFINITIONS
All definitions are standard and so are the notations.
: The exponent of a finite group G is the least common multiple of all possible orders of elements in G. For a finite p-group, it is the largest order of an element in G. : The center of a group G, denoted by Z(G), is the set of all elements in G that commute with every element of G. 
Both of these groups are 2-generator p-groups, the first one has exponent p and the second one has exponent p 2 . In this paper we study the MOR cryptosystem using M, similar study can be done with N and with the D 8 and Q 8 , with similar conclusions. Let φ be an automorphism of M, then φ can be written as
hence the group of inner automorphisms of M, denoted by I, is isomorphic to Z p × Z p . This gives the following exact sequence:
There are two kinds of automorphisms of M, one that is trivial on Z(M) and the other that is not. Since any automorphism of the center of M can be extended to an automorphism of M, the automorphism that acts nontrivially on the center are generated by
where θ is primitive mod p. If we denote the automorphisms that are trivial on the center by H, then there is an exact sequence of the form
Since for M, the central and the inner automorphisms are identical, the inner automorphisms are of the form x → xz
Hence we have shown that any automorphism φ of M is a composition of automorphisms, (5), inner automorphism and an element from SL(2, p).
It is not hard to see that if φ is given by
and φ m is given by
So the discrete logarithm problem in the automorphism φ is converted to the discrete logarithm problem in GL(2, p). Once can use m i and n i , i = 1, 2 in φ, such that, the matrix T is in SL(2, p). The best algorithm to solve the discrete logarithm problem in matrices is the Menezes-Wu algorithm [5] . That algorithm finds the eigenvalues of the matrix and the eigenvalues of the power of that matrix, and then try to solve the discrete logarithm problem in those eigenvalues. So if the characteristic polynomial corresponding to the matrix of φ is irreducible then the complexity to solve the discrete logarithm problem in φ and φ m is identical to solving the discrete logarithm problem in F p 2 .
Extra-special p-groups of exponent
p. An extra-special group P is a p-group, in which the center Z(P ), the commutator P ′ , and the Frattini subgroup Φ(P ) are equal and cyclic of order p [7, Definition 4.14]. The two most important extra-special p-groups are M and N above. Extra-special p-groups are well studied and their automorphism groups was described by Winter [8] . We don't want to redo all the work done by Winter but refer an interested reader to his paper [8] .
Let P be the iterative central product [2, Section2.2] of M with itself r times. As we know M is a group of order p 3 and exponent p. This makes P an extra-special p-group of exponent p. The finite presentation for the group P is the following [2, Page 33]:
each of x i , y i and z is of order p.
One can define a non-degenerate, bilinear alternating form, B, on P Φ(P ) as a vector space over Z p [2, Page 33] . Let x, y ∈ P , and x, y be their image
. Then B (x, y) = c, where
Description of the automorphisms of P involves three steps.
A: Find all automorphisms that are non-trivial on the center. B: Prove that an automorphism preserves the bilinear form if and only if it acts trivially on the center. Let H be the subgroup of the automorphism group that acts trivially on the center. C: Prove that H/I ∼ = Sp(2r, p). Where I is the subgroup of inner automorphisms of P and Sp(2r, p) is the symplicitic group on the vector space P Φ(P ) over Z p , defined by the bilinear form B.
We briefly sketch the proof of the above three assertions, for details, see [8] . It is known that for an extra-special p-group the inner automorphisms are identical to the central automorphisms. Hence the inner automorphisms are given by
Clearly there are p 2n inner automorphisms of P .
(A). The automorphisms that doesn't act trivially on Z(P ) are given by powers of z → z θ , where θ is a primitive element mod p. Notice that Z(P )
is a cyclic group of order p. Hence these automorphisms can be defined by:
where θ is primitive mod p. Clearly, θ is of order p − 1.
(B-C). Corresponding to an automorphism φ of P , one can trivially define an automorphism φ on P Φ(P )
. Then the automorphism φ preserves the bilinear form B if and only if φ acts trivially on Z(P ). This follows from the equation
Hence there is a homomorphism τ : H → Sp(2r, p). It is easy to see that the kernel is the set of inner automorphisms I. This proves that H/I ∼ = Sp(2r, p).
By an argument identical to the MOR cryptosystem in M, one can reduce the discrete logarithm problem in the extra-special p-group P to that of a discrete logarithm problem in Sp(2r, p). The discrete logarithm problem in Sp(2r, p), in the best case scenario (irreducible characteristic polynomial), embeds into an discrete logarithm problem in F p 2r .
CONCLUSION
The discrete logarithm problem is the backbone of many modern day public key cryptosystems and key exchanges. A MOR cryptosystem generalizes the central idea of the discrete logarithm problem from a group to any finitely generated algebraic structure.
It was an open question, if one can build a secure MOR cryptosystem using the finite presentation of a group. We have shown that the answer is yes.
The situation with other extra-special p-groups is almost identical.
